ABSTRACT This article argues that the computer game can be a locus of aesthetic form in contemporary culture. The context for understanding this claim is the decline of the artwork as bearer of form in the late 20th century, as this was understood by Adorno. Form is the enigmatic other of instrumental reason that emerges spontaneously in creative works and, in the modern era, is defined as that which makes them captivating and enigmatic yet resistant to analytic understanding. Clarification of the ways in which form is at work in game play is sought from aesthetic theory (Kant), ludology (or theory of games), and the idea of a neo-baroque entertainment culture (Ndalianis). Kant emphasized the role of play in the constitution of imaginary realms associated with aesthetic pleasure. Ludology takes play as an anthropological given differentiated historically by the development of game structures. Neo-baroque theory postulates a labyrinthine, complex and de-centred entertainment culture, largely shaped by computing as a cultural practice. The article synthesizes insights from these perspectives and, drawing on ideas from Adorno and Benjamin, argues that computer games can occupy an oppositional or critical role within contemporary aesthetics and culture. Reflection on the constitutive processes of computer game play discloses a new place for instrumental reason within aesthetic experience, as the dialectic of form and analysis migrates from traditional art materials to digital electronics.
INTRODUCTION
How should we understand the computer game? For many critical theorists computer games have not demanded the kind of attention associated with serious study. This is obviously a mistake. Computer games are big business and measured in terms of the amount of time people spend playing them, the numbers of people involved and the amounts of money they invest in them, computer games are a major element of contemporary culture (see Newman, 2004 , for relevant data). For other readers, the attempt to characterize 'the computer game' as if this phrase grasped a singular phenomenon will seem misguided. Computer games span numerous genres and encompass several modalities of play or interactivity and, as such, they defy ready comprehension within a single theoretical framework. This objection is much stronger, but also misconceived. Computer games have in common a shared material basis in digital computer technology and they have evolved within the frame of reference of a bounded sub-culture which continues to impose norms and expectations that limit the, still relatively new, cultural medium. This article attempts to engage the computer game as a locus of aesthetic form in digitized societies. Positioning the computer game in this way, it becomes clear that it stands somewhere between the traditional 'game', which structures play, and the aesthetic object or 'artwork', which works by stimulating the play of imaginative and cognitive faculties in the subject of aesthetic experience.
The analysis centres on play and concurs with ludology in asserting that this concept should be central to any discussion of computer games. If we want to assess the computer game as a form we must start with play and not with narrative meaning or any other conceptual apparatus. However, it is equally wrong to pursue the prioritization properly afforded to play exclusively in the direction of an analogy with traditional games. To seek a 'heart of gameness' ( Juul, 2003b) that will clarify what is fundamental to the computer game is, by this argument, doomed to fail. What is distinctive to the computer game form can only be partially understood by examining its game character; it is also an aesthetic object and the kind of play we engage in with it is best understood as an embodiment of the subjective experience of play associated with art objects and reflected in the philosophical discourse of aesthetics. All games are, in this sense, only part game, and that is one reason why it is so difficult to pin down what they all have in common. A taxonomical-analytical mode of enquiry misses the mark with regard to computer games in particular, however, because it obscures the central enigma that makes computer games interesting in the first place. The enigmatic character of computer games, which is their most important feature, can, perhaps, only be grasped in terms of what is left out by purely extensional, analytical categorizations.
Every player of a game is concerned with its details and all game criticism traces out the fine structure of the play experience. 1 The best walkthroughs, however, disclose nothing of that seductive pull that makes us want to play. Indeed, while attention to detail and intense concentration on the game are essential to enjoyment of play, these are also the things that finally menace our pleasure in the game and bring it gradually to a halt. The enigma is the 'more' -that added something that is essential to, yet finally extirpated by, good game play (see Friedman, 1995) . This 'more', which is essential to the computer game as a form and which distinguishes it from other games, is of a kind with the more that Adorno isolated as the defining feature of beauty, when he wrote that 'What is beautiful in nature is what appears to be more than what is literally there ' (2002: 71) . Art inherits this more from our first experiences of it in nature. But, Adorno reminds us darkly, there is nothing fixed or guaranteed about this inheritance. What we think of and experience as art is a potentially shifting point in a cultural constellation and the relationships that hold between points in one epoch can give way to new configurations in another. Aesthetic experience might migrate from what is commonly called art and be discovered somewhere else.
Jesper Juul has written that 'the history of computer games is really a history of continually making computer games attractive in new ways ' (2003a) . This remark could lead us into listing the gratuitous innovations, at the level of rule changes, graphics, and so on, which have been used to market games during the last 40 years. But Juul also sees another possibility:
The development of any art form is at least partly to find that the emphasis can be shifted; that the details of everyday life can be interesting; that the painting does not have to represent anything; that the rhythm can be as important as the melody. (Juul, 2003a) Here he aligns the ability of games to retain our interest to a similar capacity in art. In this article I want to deepen this idea not in the direction of an analogy, but by situating the computer game directly in the history of aesthetic forms. In the post-Holocaust world, art has been in crisis, no longer able to support the kind of theological 'meaning' that we look to it to provide. When Adorno wrote that there could be no poetry after Auschwitz, this was what he had in mind. He also wrote that the expulsion of aesthetic form from art in the name of aesthetic value -preservation of the presence that exceeds literal description -was, in the mid-1960s, an open question. He could anticipate a time when such a rejection of art would be the best available defence of art (2002: 53) . It is as an aesthetic form that, I will argue, the computer game emerges at the end of art in the traditional sense. This is not to say -foolishly -that the computer game supplants or replaces art, but it is to suggest -playfully -that it occupies some of the ground where art once stood. 2 Possessing aesthetic form is one of the things that the computer game does and this is essential to its stubborn success as an element in contemporary culture.
LUDOLOGY
Ludology asserts that if we want to understand computer games we must concentrate on play. What matters about computer games and what distinguishes them from other cultural phenomena is brought to the fore only by asking what they are like to play and by exploring what it is to play with them. Ludology, however, is not a playful theory of play because it has too many reasons to be serious. It is trying to force a culture, specifically an academic culture, to take seriously something that has been derided and neglected -the computer game. To make their case convincing, ludologists have to be more grown up than the grown ups; they have to assume the role of the angry parent. At the same time, though, the point of ludology remains guilty and perhaps even silly: We must take the computer game and define an entirely new discipline around it. This is both the comic apotheosis of academic specialization and the expression of an important truth. This contradiction explains the severity with which ludologists approach debate.
Many have felt ludology's harshness of tone to be indicative of intellectual intolerance (see the exchanges in Electronic Book Review, 2004) . The violence with which ludology asserts itself is necessary, however, because it is establishing a new discipline, computer game studies, with its own problematic. And, as Bachelard (1984) tells us, this always involves a break that is social and political as well as epistemological. Ludology identifies the computer game as a form and it is absolutely vital that we engage and understand this form before we begin to think about what meanings might adhere to specific instances of it. This distinction separates works of art -paintings, sculptures, symphonies, perhaps even poems and novels -from texts. The problem with ludology is not that it enforces this boundary too vehemently but rather that it does not understand its own activity well enough. It is in this context that we can explain the paucity of ludological analyses of actual games, compared with the proliferation of essays and books that make use of film theory, narrative theory, cultural theory, etc. 3 The essential truth of ludology currently resides in its critique of these interpretative positions when applied to games.
The ludology-narratology dispute would amount to little more than a spat between a few egos over university resources, however, if the object of the new discipline did not justify it. 4 This brings us directly to the issue of form. It is necessary to establish a new discipline in connection with the computer game precisely because questions of meaning and the standard tools of interpreting for meaning do not obtain here. One of Juul's early interventions clarifies why computer games are, at the most fundamental level, resistant to analysis as 'meaningful texts' or narratives:
In a verbal narrative, the grammatical tense will necessarily present a temporal relation between the time of the narration (narrative time) and the events told (story time). Additionally, it is possible to talk of a third time, the reading or viewing time . . . the game constructs the story time as synchronous with narrative time and reading/viewing time: the story time is now. Now, not just in the sense that the viewer witnesses events now, but in the sense that events are happening now, and that what comes next is not determined. (2001: 13, 14) Put simply, there is no distinction in game play between the time of narrating and the time that passes in the 'story'. In the absence of this tension it makes no sense to approach games as instances of story-craft. Their fundamental dynamic lies elsewhere. Espen Aarseth locates it firmly in play: 'The game plays the user just as the user plays the game, and there is no message apart from the play ' (1997: 162) .
Implied here is a radical disjunction, possibly a claim for the autonomy of the computer game form from the discursive and communicative context of contemporary society and culture. In terms of overt, symbolic content, computer games often seem to be of a piece with contemporary popular culture, but the matter of its aesthetic form sets the computer game apart from media, narratives and everyday life, all of which constitute domains in which meaning is held to play a decisive mediating role. In games it is not meaning but form that defines their appeal and governs how they enter our experience and what role they play in our lives. While this fact may itself have a meaning, subject to a wide range of interpretations, comprehending its mechanics demands a different approach to that recommended by any of the established branches of social, cultural or literary theory.
To some extent, ludology tends to retreat behind the denunciation of narrative into a policing role. 5 Any scholar who says anything about games is initially told that what they have said is not original. Theorists who explore interactivity, for instance, are regularly denounced for adding nothing to 'reception theory'. This denunciation of the 'not new' is more than a habit of mind of specific individuals, it is a recurrent theme in email and blog exchanges between ludologists and their targets. Ludology's thirst for the new reflects a sense that, while computer games themselves are not new, they remain un-theorized, not properly understood by the academy. Analyses that describe games in terms of established theory always miss the very thing that is essential to these experiences. The problem for ludology, however, is that it too feels the absence of a discourse within which to grasp and comprehend those experiences. The obvious way out is positivism -to measure and analyse play as a category in sociology or anthropology. However, the experience of play with a computer game cannot be specified 78 Thesis Eleven (Number 89 2007) distribution.
analytically in a merely extensional account of game play processes. If it could, we would be able to dispense with games and substitute excellent ludological narratives about them. Ludology's assertion of measurable properties that align computer games with older games and the established literature on play fails to grasp the specificity of experience with computer games.
Under attack from ludologists, narratologists always find themselves falling back on the obvious defence, namely, that we should let many flowers bloom. A diversity of approaches to the computer game is, at this stage, best. Presumably, when we establish a sufficient quantity of discourse it will become clear that some approaches are more productive, in the various possible senses of that term, than others. However, while this sounds sensible it is certainly false. It is impossible to disagree with ludology that the attempts to 'decode' games -to read them as if they were films or books, to 'extract meaning' from games -are always unsatisfying to anyone who actually plays the games. The dispute is reminiscent of Adorno's observation that the work of art is limited to a narrow 'space between discursive barbarism and poetic euphemism ' (2002: 32) . This is the situation of computer game scholarship: Discursive barbarism would neglect the whole issue of form and rush to interpret meanings codified in games. Ludology senses that this is wrong, but can only offer aggressive rhetoric aimed at curbing it and not a rival discourse adequate to the cultural autonomy of their object. Academic euphemism and a posture of extreme seriousness stand in for recognition of the centrality of form and aggressive pursuit of its implications. What is needed is a theory of the nature of this narrow space which, it seems, the computer game occupies. Ludology identifies and guards this space, but does not recognize it as the question of aesthetic form. I submit that the question of form resurfaces now because we are in a new cultural constellation, one that is defined by a digital aesthetic.
At this point, however, there might seem to be a problem with the claim that this 'aesthetic' evaluation of games is consistent with the central insights of ludology. For ludologists, games are not art, but games, and it is beginning to seem as if an 'aesthetic' appraisal of them might be every bit as much a 'colonization' as the attempt to 'read' computer games as narratives. Here, though, it is important to re-situate the central concept of ludology -playwhere it belongs, namely, within the discourse of philosophical aesthetics.
PLAY IN THE DISCOURSE OF AESTHETICS
Thus far, ludology's insistence that computer games are about play has led it to align the computer game with earlier games (Juul, 2006: 16) . Games are seen as rule governed systems that structure play without negating its essentially purposeless character. Play is anthropologically primitive, linking human nature to that of animals (Huizinga, 1950) . Games differentiate and organize play and their degree of complexity can even be seen as indexical for 'civilization' (Caillois, 1958) . The history of games provides the context within which computer games should be understood. Of all social and cultural forms, the game enjoys a privileged relationship to play and the computer game extends and updates this tradition. The task of the ludologist, on this understanding, is to clarify what unites the diversity of play and games and to study specific instances of these phenomena in relation to this understanding. The problem with this vision is that it takes for granted the strength of the association between play and games. In the history of play it has also been differentiated by other dimensions of human cultural life. Most importantly, play features prominently in the inner life of art and in the reflective discourse of philosophical aesthetics. This is nowhere more clear than in Kant's (1961 Kant's ( [1790 ) Critique of Judgement, the starting point for modern aesthetic theory. Kant repeatedly emphasizes that what is characteristic of aesthetic experience is play in the mental life of the human subject. What Kant means by play in this context refers primarily to imagination and its relationship to cognition. Play of these faculties is the basis of our experience of the beautiful. Aesthetic experience occurs when we find that something is pleasing to us by virtue of its form. 6 Such an object stimulates us in the sense that it provokes and incites a feeling response, but it does so in a way that goes beyond merely being pleasing to the eye. In aesthetic experience, which for Kant is almost exclusively about natural beauty, we find our imagination is pitched against our understanding -we can discern 'order and finality' in the object but not its purpose. It seems to be deliberate and yet its purpose is withheld from us. While this might sound annoying, it is a fundamentally pleasurable experience because its resonances bring us to a heightened sense of the harmony that exists between ourselves and the divine, super-sensible, order. In its freedom, the play at the heart of aesthetic experience amplifies our sense of ourselves as free, moral agents. Kant contrasts an intelligent and autonomous exercise of taste, which fathoms this internal movement excited in the subject, with judgements that are based merely on superficial responses to objects:
Taste that requires an added element of charm and emotion for its delight, not to speak of adopting this as the measure of its approval, has not yet emerged from barbarism . . . A judgement of taste which is uninfluenced by charm or emotion . . . and whose determining ground is, therefore, simply finality of form, is a pure judgement of taste. (1961 [1790]: 65) True aesthetic judgement centres on the form that solicits this internal play of the faculties. Aesthetic objects have the paradoxical form of a purposeless finality; they are supremely well executed, delightful things, and yet we cannot see any purpose in the perfection. They present us with a form so precise that it seems to be mathematically ordered, yet we cannot conceive 80 Thesis Eleven (Number 89 2007) distribution.
a formula adequate to describe them. 7 This is why beautiful things 'play' with our faculties. Kant puts play at the centre of aesthetic experience, noting that 'play of every kind . . . is attended with no further interest than that of making the time pass by unheeded ' (1961 [1790] : 166). While it is internal to the subject, the kind of play Kant has in mind is not merely an intellectual construct far removed from play-stations and imaginary swords. On the contrary, he emphasizes that it is the very same play we associate with fun and with the physical. Moreover, this play has a formal reality that is independent of considerations of meaning:
Music . . . and what provokes laughter are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas, or even with representation of the understanding, by which, all said and done, nothing is thought. By mere force of change they are yet able to afford lively gratification. This furnishes pretty clear evidence that the quickening effect of both is physical, despite its being excited by ideas of the mind, and that the feeling of health, arising from a movement of the intestines answering to that of play, makes up that entire gratification of an animated gathering upon the spirit and refinement of which we set such store. (1961 [1790]: 198-9) What is already clear from this is that play, however fundamental we take it to be, is not only differentiated historically by games. Aesthetic form exerts the hold it does over successive generations of humans primarily because it too works with the playful and the humorous. Giving play shape and refashioning it in the context of changing cultural constellations, aesthetic form has remained centred on play. Moreover, the essentially purposeless character of play carries over into art too, where straightforward literal meanings have no place. It is not because they are visually pleasing or stimulating to the senses that computer games are aesthetic. It is because they facilitate play and have the kind of form that corresponds to long-standing ideas about aesthetic experience as an autonomous sphere of value. The value in question here can be understood in Kantian terms, as a hint at the divine, or, in Adornian terms, as sparking a sense of the magical.
THE SIN OF SEMBLANCE
Surely, though, computer games are not 'art'? Valid art is not defined by its choice of materials. The 'inner-aesthetic' sensibility characteristic of artists does not inoculate them against social change, including transformations at the most basic, technical level. Adorno anticipated that future manifestations of the spirit of art would arise, not from where we had been taught to expect them -institutions, galleries, museums -but from technology and the material, productive basis of society. Only here would artists find theThe antagonism in the concept of technique as something determined inneraesthetically and as something developed externally to artworks, should not be conceived as absolute. It originated historically and can pass. In electronics it is already possible to produce artistically by manipulating means that originated extra-aesthetically. (2002: 33) In the modern era art has become de-aestheticized. It can no longer provide affirmation of the divine and so cannot be beautiful. The only response to the crisis of art that has any integrity is for art to be at war with itself. In modern art, aesthetic objects are in this state. They are meaningful only by a convoluted process in which they display both the subjective need for meaning and its objective denial within themselves. It might seem as if computer games break with this. Increasingly, they offer sumptuous interfaces that represent colourful, populated worlds. If computer games are judged primarily with reference to the quality of their vivid graphical depiction of 'game worlds', they are guilty of the 'sin of semblance'. Adorno would surely have condemned such game interfaces as 'affirmative' depictions of the world and, as such, as implicated in ideological, even barbarous assertions of the rightness of the world and the human capacity for meaningful representation. If the game interface is as important as most gamers seem to take it to be then, judged aesthetically, games would indeed be barbaric.
Modern art became increasingly abstract and montage and construction moved to the fore as art 'abjured semblance' (Adorno, 2002: 155) . Now semblance returns, abstraction and montage retreat. Meaning might seem, thereby, to be retrieved, and it is this that threatens to make computer games barbarous. This is Gonzalo Frasca's concern in his article, 'Is it Barbaric to Design Computer Games after Auschwitz?' (Frasca, 2000) . His solution is the 'ephemeral game', which can only be played once. But the gameworld is not a 'semblance of a continuum grounded in the unity of subjective experience' (Adorno, 2002: 155) . It always presents as a challenge to the player to construct such a unity and it is a conspiracy to prevent them from doing so. Moreover, at the end of the process, when we complete the game -this has been noticed by many players -we do not come away with a convincing narrative of our accomplishments, but rather something quite opposed to this. Even in the 'save' file, there is no record of what we have done. Its reconstruction would demand that we repeat the experience. In this way, all games are ephemeral in the sense that Frasca recommends. What can keep them from being barbaric is the extent to which game designers are mindful of this and create games that make us want to play them over and over. This would be a matter of creating games with form.
In his most recent work, Juul has argued that the main difference between computer games and traditional games is that the former are 'less abstract ' (2006: 1) in that game states and what he calls 'game worlds' are made more manifestly present through computer game interfaces than through media like boards and counters. This explains why, although the 82 Thesis Eleven (Number 89 2007) distribution.
computer game seems to be an overtly visual medium, screen imagery in games is nearly always of relatively poor quality. 8 The 'semblance' in computer games is not the simulation of post-modern theory -a copy that is better than or as good as the original. As David Roberts points out, in contemporary media 'enlightenment has not been transformed into the blank face of simulation but into the inescapable reflection of the tension of appearance and reality ' (1991: 203) . Paradoxically, the representational element in games is both essential to the game form (even where the meaning of the imagery is radically underdetermined as in Tetris) and nugatory (even in games where it seems to be vital). Hence, Juul claims that computer games can make game worlds more effectively than traditional games because they are 'immaterial ' (2006: 162) . The game interface is there simply to facilitate play, after the fashion of, but in a quite distinct manner from, the rules, pitch, counters etc. of traditional games.
To grasp this it is necessary to view the game as projection of a fictional world from the player's perspective. Images of play serve to orientate the player towards the game, which is essentially about rapid fire puzzle solving and managing the values attached to variables in a dynamic environment. This sounds like a description of a simulation, but actually every state change at the game interface is always at the same time an extrusion of the player's inner world. Every 'what's that?' is always attended by a 'what am I going to do?', or a doing. In game play there is neither ontological commitment, of the kind that would inaugurate a 'game world', nor withdrawal into imagination. Game play is not 'interactivity' because once the play has begun the actions of the player are the events in the machine (cf. Galloway, 2006: 3) . Good game play is a dance, a form involving inner-subjective and outerobjective dimensions equally at each moment. For this reason we can say that the semblance in game interfaces is not a semblance (simulation, representation) of anything but the game itself. As such it is actually unnecessary to anyone who has the real thing, the game, who embodies the game, so to speak. Viewed in this way, games can be seen as the next phase in the internal decomposition of art, anticipated by Adorno when he wrote of semblance being bought at the price of a revival of play within the work. It is guilt that summons play. In games the element of semblance is accentuated in proportion to the element of play. The underlying rationale is not the post-modern, uncritical embrace of surface imagery. Rather it is the cynical and humorous: 'Yes, it's a beautiful image, but you'd be wrong to take it seriously'. Adorno discerned similar tendencies in the playful character of some modern art works when he wrote that, 'As play, art seeks to absolve itself of the guilt of its semblance ' (2002: 39) .
The vulgar is and always was an essential element in the spirit that animates artistic production. Like Kant, Adorno is often wrongly associated with a purely intellectual appreciation of aesthetic form. Yet he writes that art is inspired by its plebeian element (2002: 240) ; that the vulgar play element of the circus prefigures and is present in all great art (2002: 81) ; that animal, foolish, childish play is an 'essential layer ' of art (2002: 119) , and he likens artistic experience to fireworks enjoyed by the masses (2002: 79-80) . 9 Incorporated into objects fashioned by the language of aesthetic form, these elements provide a 'magic spark', essential to the enigmatic nature of aesthetic experience. Similarly, Henri Focillon argued that form in art is not an abstraction, indeed it is the thorough implication of form in the material of the artwork that distinguishes it from textual meaning:
We must never think of forms, in their different states, as simply suspended in some remote, abstract zone, above the earth and above man. They mingle with life, whence they come; they translate into space certain movements of the mind . . . An identical form keeps its dimensions, but changes its quality according to the material, the tool and the hand. A text does not change because of the different papers on which it chances to be printed; the paper is but the support for the text. In a drawing, however, the paper is an element of life; it is the very heart of the design. A form without support is not form, and the support itself is form. (1992: 60, 62) In computer games we encounter a semblance of something that cannot be real (hence, 'simulation'), while at the same time it can express a different kind of truth than is possible in literal language (the dance). It is in this sense that the computer game as a form can be more than its empiria. Its form exceeds each specific instance of it and is intrinsically associated with its digital-material character. Attempts to define it with reference to the set of its instantiations, the methodological programme of ludology, overlook this, the enigma at the heart of the appeal of the computer game.
THE NEO-BAROQUE
Attempts to specify the formal content of the computer game as aesthetic medium will always fall foul of the same criticism that is directed here against positivistic ludology. A mere enumeration of patterns, or experiences associated with good game play, will gesture only at the enigma that makes us want to play. Understanding such common patterns, however, does give us an idea of what is specific to the digital game as material artefact, a more satisfying account of subjective game play experience, and it helps us specify the relationship between game form and the broader culture. Angela Ndalianis (2003) provides such a characterization. She argues that contemporary entertainment forms can be interpreted as 'neo-baroque', and this entails that they are:
1. Polycentric. Neo-baroque entertainment forms are not susceptible to linear readings associated with traditional texts. As Aarseth puts it, games are 'ergodic ' (1997) , structured in accordance with the branching algorithms that regulate the behaviour of the computer interface.
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2. Labyrinthine. Contemporary entertainment involves starting from nowhere in particular and navigating a course to somewhere else equally non-specific. Ndalianis stresses the role of the consumer in co-creating the artefact thus: 'the baroque aspects of labyrinthicity emerge when the construction of the labyrinth itself . . . becomes a significant source of the work's meaning ' (2003: 86) . 10 3. Repetitive. Modern entertainment forms involve repetition. The same actions are performed over and over until they are 'right' and a new way forward becomes available or the game is over.
4. Demanding of technological virtuosity. The complex and mazy navigations of the player, as they construct an experience from the game program, is both skilful in itself and involves being constantly reminded of the skills of the game designer or programmer. The virtuosity of both player and author of the game is 'specifically technological ' (2003: 152) . In this way, the game always involves both spectacular effects and an immediate awareness that they are merely effects (2003: 170).
For Ndalianis, these are defining properties of contemporary entertainment culture beyond games. She rightly discerns, however, that they originate in the new technological basis of artistic production, namely, digital computers. Focillon emphasizes, in the quote above but also elsewhere, that the form of a work is a matter of negotiation between the artist and the 'dark matter' that s/he works with. Creativity involves 'cleaving form to matter' with virtuoso skill, and part of this virtuosity is finding that specific affinity with the available materials that ensures the final form of the work of art reflects something, beyond the reach of physical science, about the material itself. 'Between nature and man form intervenes ' (1992 [1938] : 124) and, through a process Focillon calls mitosis, there is a quasi-biological proliferation of forms. These are then incarnated in works of art, each of which is 'the record of an activity' and 'is constantly awaiting reactivation'. Focillon goes on: if form is taken as a static reality, then a work of art is not form but a plan of activity, form inhabited by a tension, a dynamism that lives it and animates it from within. (1992 [1938]: 20) A person appreciating the work re-activates its form, bringing it back into dynamic existence. The analogy with game play is clear, but there is also a difference. Appreciating a painting is not creating the painting anew, re-entering the struggle with the matter and re-establishing the form of the work in this active sense. Yet this is what is required of a gamer, who encounters the computer game as a plan, or a program for cleaving form from the computer.
The obvious analogy here is with musicians, who are presented with musical scores and instruments. The composer provides a plan that is suitably sensitive to the musical tools of the time and this contains the idea, or form, which could not have existed without engagement with those instruments and the material properties of sound in a given era. But the musician must be able to play the work in order that s/he and others can appreciate it in anything other than a purely intellectual way, in other words, as what it is -an experience, an object that defies measurement and a position in relation to a broader culture. If, in the modern period, the subject contracted to a point in the face of an overwhelming system, now it is the system that has contracted into something dense and dark, which is only illuminated by the activity of the subject (cf. Lash, 2002: 2) . The tension art created in the subject, the subject now creates in the digital game. Musical performers follow the musical score exactly, but, in a way, they do not know what they play because they play for others. Their best is achieved when they are most absent, serving as mere channels for the composition. Hence, Adorno writes that:
Artworks are enigmatic in that they are the physiognomy of an objective spirit that is never transparent to itself in the moment in which it appears. . . . Artworks do not achieve what is objectively sought in them. The zone of indeterminacy between the unreachable and what has been realized constitutes their enigma. (2002: 128) Here we can see the full significance -the aesthetic significance -of multi-player gaming. The presence of others restores the zone of indeterminacy described here because in multi-player games we have a contrast between our play and the play of others, and their reactions to our play. In multi-player games we are exposed to the diverse conventions of play and the full range of its possibilities. There is a strong sense of virtuosity in play, which is reflected in the fact that computer game players can now become professionals and their skills are as admired as those of professional sports players or musicians, although it seems that this is only really a lucrative activity in Korea (see King, 2003, and Fong, 2004) .
In his study of the first baroque, Walter Benjamin argued that its works were not important for their symbolic meaning-content. Indeed, if we read them at this level, their fascination for 17th-century audiences is perplexing, much as the appeal of computer games stands out as odd to reflective cultural critics who cannot find anything worthwhile in them (discursive barbarians simply pretend to embrace them in their vulgarity). In baroque works the characters are undeveloped, the storylines are obvious and repetitive and the audiences have to work too hard to extract anything worthwhile from them. Benjamin describes how the element of play and games becomes foregrounded in works of this era, in proportion as they become more explicitly secularized. This involved overt experimentation with dramatic convention, pushing convention itself into the foreground and effectively trivializing themes that would once have carried heavy symbolic and religious meanings. He uses the example of death, a recurring theme in the baroque (and pivot of almost all computer game action), and describes how in baroque plays we find 'the replacement of the execution of the victim at the 86 Thesis Eleven (Number 89 2007) distribution.
altar with his escape from the knife of the sacrificial priest; the destined victim . . . runs around the altar ' (1985: 107) . The plays work, however, because their formal qualities assign them a unique relationship to the prevailing social order. Foregrounding artifice means that the plays are enjoyed more as 'intrigues' (p. 97), while their moral content exists 'only in the most indirect form' (p. 105). There is no satirical or symbolic 'meaning', for Benjamin, in baroque works. But, in their meandering repetitiousness (p. 137) and their ostentatious display of themselves as (mere) plays, baroque entertainments constitute allegories for life in an absolutist social system. This was the key to their mass appeal:
Even if the language of these dramas had been exclusively a matter for scholars, the uneducated would still have derived enjoyment from the element of spectacle. But the bombast corresponded to the expressive impulses of the age, and these impulses are usually immeasurably stronger than the intellectual interest in the transparent details of plot . . .
In the anagrams, the onomatopoeic phrases and many other examples of linguistic virtuosity, word, syllable and sound are emancipated from any context of traditional meaning and are flaunted as objects which can be exploited for allegorical purposes. The language of the baroque is constantly convulsed by rebellion on the part of the elements which make it up. (1985: 207) Reference and precision seem to disappear, as forms surface in the production of the work, forms that take on intensified meaning by becoming iconic and fragmentary. The similarities with computer games abound here (cf. Stallabrass, 1996: 103) and are nowhere clearer than in Benjamin's summing up of how the allegorical content of baroque works relates to their political character, which resides not at the level of intelligible meaning but at that of the rude gesture at power:
Above all, it is the offensive, the provocative quality of the gesture which is baroque. Where man is drawn towards the symbol, allegory emerges from the depths of being to intercept the intention, and to triumph over it. (1985: 183) In this way meaning, what we are drawn to as the sin of semblance, is deferred in place of a growing awareness of pattern and form. This awareness calls forth an embodied, playful response which is initially pleasing but, once we have mastered it, loses its appeal. This is a political allegory for contemporary social experience. 11
CONCLUSION: PLAY IN THE DIGITAL CONSTELLATION
There is an emerging consensus on the growing cultural significance of the computer game. For Kline et al., games are the 'ideal commodity of contemporary capitalism ' (2003: 76) . As left-wing media theorists they denounce the form for its 'militarised masculinity', its 'promotion of branding and marketing aimed at children' and its failure to really experiment with the possibilities opened up by computer technology for educational applications (see also Stallabrass, 1996: 93) . Although it reeks of discursive barbarism, there is something to their critique of contemporary games. However, in their book they do not discuss play, how it works in the computer game, or the implications of its movement to the centre of contemporary culture. The title of the work (Digital Play ) aside, they do not actually discuss the concept at all. It is something of a travesty that the best critical political economy of the computer game to date is marked by such a glaring omission. Focusing on play enables us to oppose (dialectically) to this idea of the computer game as 'ideal commodity' of the age as in Adorno's observation that 'The absolute artwork converges with the absolute commodity ' (2002: 22) . In the computer game the element of popular embodied play rediscovers its connection with aesthetic form. The politics of this are complex and contradictory, but it is at this level that the cultural significance of the game must be assessed.
Ludology demands that games are studied in terms of play. In so far as this demand hits the mark, it threatens the relationship of computer games with the culture industry. Ludology is always critical, even when it tries to be no more than analytical, because it puts the focus on form in the computer game. This form occupies a contradictory position in the cultural politics of the neo-baroque. The repetitive nature of computer games, especially early games, seems to reinforce the idea that they are 'mass cultural' commodities. However, as Ndalianis argues (2003: 106) , the increased complexity of the computer game in recent years has seen repetition take on novel and productive aspects. Mere repetition without difference would be the popular music Adorno hated, but it is important to notice that, in the pre-digital constellation, true repetition -that is, a literal copy -was impossible. When we encountered its appearance in analogue media it was always a kind of contrivance (for Adorno, one that was never free of condescension), in which each iteration represented, or was derivative of, another. This changes with digital technology because here we find objects that are truly identical, in themselves. There is, as a result, a dialectical reversal. If previously the material of the work of art was non-self-identical, shifting and amorphous, and its order was imposed on it by the artist, then the challenge for aesthetic critique was to assess the quality of that ordering. This was the point of Adorno's distinction. Either the rhythm of the work would be merely technological as a kind of hammering out of the same message over and over, driving towards identity. Or it would be aesthetic, in which case there would still be discernible pattern and repetition, but this would be nuanced and playful, aiming at the creation of something individual and unique in the language of form. 12 Adorno's distinction between the 'heteronomous domination of the not same' and the 'ineluctable determination of the unlike by a degree of 88 Thesis Eleven (Number 89 2007) distribution. sameness' (2002: 141) is one that should be applied to individual computer games as a standard -do they make us dance, or are they empty? We have games of both types, and Adorno's distinction points us towards a fuller, aesthetic appreciation of the computer game. Some 'seeming same' in the form of recognizable patterns is essential if we are to grasp the essential not-sameness that is the ethereal, tentative work. The new situation redeems calculating, scientific reason, which now extricates itself from implication in the history of domination. The play of science in the computer opens out onto technology and leverage over the world, but also becomes the starting point for aestheticization. Both require deviation from the basic digital repetition -on/off; 0 or 1. Each must create the unlike out of the same.
For Adorno, the artwork promises romantic reconciliation with nature (a reconciliation it cannot provide). Perhaps great computer games promise an alternative configuration of technology-human-society. They also cannot deliver, because the social relations of production have not changed. According to Adorno, contemporary art struggles to maintain the tension between what it is and what it appears to be and, as seen above, these forces threaten art's immanent decomposition. Just as the artwork decomposes as we contemplatively work our way through it, so the game is actively destroyed by the player who constantly sees through its promise. The game is more than it seems to be and this is more a spell cast by the player (subjectively cast, objectively necessitated) and a shadow s/he falls under. Through the player's activity s/he creates it and dispels it at the same time. That this happens in connection with technological artefacts seems to be exactly what Andrew Feenberg has in mind when he suggests that re-aestheticization of technology is an essential part of the transition to an alternative and superior civilizational model (Feenberg, 1991: 177) .
But game players know the strict identity of the game with its code (cf. Friedman, 1995; Kirkpatrick, 2004) and are not concerned with what the game 'means'. They engage only with the game form. They create the magic but at the same time they see through it. This is an allegory for life in a society in which everyone feels the necessity of large scale change, yet each knows that the little power they have to change anything will be gained only at the cost of laborious study of the behaviour of specific sub-subsystems. The art work achieved the 'magic spark' affect through an instant eruption, an appearance of vivid liberation, after which we reflected on its repression and were drawn into its conflicts. The computer game reverses the order of the aesthetic encounter. It is a difficult object that confronts us as a puzzle and in which our freedom to move is continually stymied and thwarted. In arriving at 'liberation', which is most often the culmination of the game through violent, strategic, intense play, we undo its spell but are restored to the world with a new sense of the possible and of its limits.
If art left us feeling the dark truth of the post-Holocaust, totally administered world, the computer game can give us post-modern cynics a more must be defined both in terms of their relation to the world and in terms of art's repudiation of that world' (Adorno 2002: 138) . 10. It is because games are like this that many parents are simply unaware of their contents, since opening sequences and screens often contain no clues (cf. Funk, 2001 ). 11. Ludologists have recognized the allegorical function of games -see Juul (2006: 133) , Aarseth (1998) and Galloway (2006: 102) . 12. This re-states in aesthetic terms what N. Katherine Hayles (1999) has suggested is the main shift in recent cultural history, namely, the move from a preoccupation with presence to a concern with 'virtual' patterns that are mobile between/across physical interfaces. 13. 'The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form' (Adorno, 2002: 6) .
